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Salary History and the Equal Pay Act: An 
Argument for the Adoption of “Reckless 
Discrimination” as a Theory of Liability 
Kate Vandenberg 
ABSTRACT 
The Equal Pay Act (EPA) purports to prohibit employers from paying female 
employees less than male employees with similar qualifications; however, the affirmative 
defenses provided in the EPA are loopholes that perpetuate the gender pay gap. In 
particular, the fourth affirmative defense allows for wage differentials based on a “factor 
other than sex.” Many federal circuits have read this defense broadly to include wage 
differentials based on salary history. That is, an employer can pay a female employee less 
than her male counterparts because she was paid less by her previous employer. While 
salary history was once viewed as an objective data point for wage setting, research now 
demonstrates that reliance on salary history merely continues the gender discrimination of 
previous employers.  
This Note proposes that a model of recklessness in employment law should be applied 
to the EPA to cover employers who continue to use salary history to determine new hire 
salaries. Applying tort concepts, a plaintiff would show that the use of salary history is a 
gendered employment practice by satisfying two elements: first, her employer knew or 
should have known that using salary history carries the risk of perpetuating 
discrimination; second, her employer’s burden to reduce the risk of perpetuating 
discrimination was slight. This model allows a plaintiff to utilize an evolving understanding 
of gendered employment practices that perpetuate the pay gap in order to undermine the 
“factor other than sex” loophole in the EPA.  
INTRODUCTION 
Congress passed the Equal Pay Act (EPA) of 1963 with the hope of eliminating the 
pay disparity between men and women.1 The EPA prohibits an employer from paying an 
employee less than her peers on the basis of sex.2 However, under the EPA, an employer 
can rely on a variety of affirmative defenses against a wage differential, including that the 
differential is based on any factor other than sex.3 The “factor other than sex” defense is a 
broad loophole exploited by employers, and the circuit courts disagree on the extent to 
which employers can frame reliance on an employee’s salary history as a “factor other 
 
1 Corning Glass Works v. Brennan, 417 U.S. 188, 195 (1974). 
2 29 U.S.C. § 206(d)(1)(2016). 
3 Id. 
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than sex.”4 Nobody knows better than Ailene Rizo just how far the United States must go 
to fully close the gender pay gap because of this “factor other than sex” defense.5  
Rizo was hired as a math consultant for the Fresno County School District and 
subsequently learned that her peers, all of whom were male, were paid a higher salary.6 
The County used a hiring schedule consisting of ten stepped salary levels.7 Rizo holds a 
number of degrees, including a Bachelor of Science in Mathematics Education, a 
Master’s Degree in Educational Technology, and a Master’s Degree in Mathematics 
Education.8 Rizo had taught math, served as the head of a math department, and was a 
math curriculum designer at a private company before applying to the school district.9 
Despite these qualifications, she was placed at step 1 of level 1 of the hiring schedule, 
whereas her male peers with similar qualifications were placed at higher levels.10 
After the Fresno County School Board refused to fix the salary disparity, Rizzo 
brought a claim under the EPA and other discrimination statutes.11 The county school 
board did not deny paying Rizo less than her male counterparts. Instead, it raised the 
affirmative defense that the wage differential was due to a factor “other than sex” because 
they used her prior salary to determine where to start her on a salary schedule.12 The 
district court denied summary judgment to the county, reasoning that “a pay structure 
based exclusively on prior wages is so inherently fraught with the risk. . . that it will 
perpetuate a discriminatory wage disparity between men and women that it cannot 
stand”.13  
The Ninth Circuit initially vacated the District Court’s decision, but later upheld the 
decision after rehearing the case en banc.14 The Ninth Circuit overturned precedent from 
1982 that allowed employers to use the new hire’s salary history as a “factor other than 
sex” if that employer could show a legitimate business reason for doing so in new hire 
salary determinations.15 The en banc panel reasoned that:  
The Equal Pay Act stands for a principle as simple as it is just: men and 
women should receive equal pay for equal work regardless of sex. The 
question before us is also simple: can an employer justify a wage 
differential between male and female employees by relying on prior 
 
4 See infra Part IV. 
5 Rizo v. Yovino, 887 F.3d 453, 456–57 (9th Cir. 2018), rev’d en banc, 139 S. Ct. 706 (2019). 
6 Rizo v. Yovino, No. 1:14-cv-0423-MJS, 2015 WL 9260587, at *4 (E.D. Cal. Dec. 18, 2015). 
7 Rizo, 887 F.3d at 457.  
8 Rizo, No. 1:14-cv-0423-MJS at *3. 
9 Id. 
10 Id. at *3–4. At the time, Rizo worked with three other math consultants: Eric Crantz, Mike Chamberlain, 
and Carl Veater. While Rizo started on salary step 1, both Chamberlain and Veater began on step 7, and 
Crantz started at step 9. Id. at *17.  
11 Id. at *1. 
12 Id. at *7.  
13 Id. at *10. 
14 Rizo, 887 F.3d at 468. 
15 See Kouba v. Allstate Ins. Co., 691 F.2d 873, 878 (9th Cir. 1982). The plaintiff represented a class of all 
female agents working at Allstate who claimed that the use of salary history led to a wage differential on 
the basis of sex. The Ninth Circuit held that the use of salary history did not constitute a discriminatory 
wage setting practice.  
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salary? Based on the text, history, and purpose of the Equal Pay Act, the 
answer is clear: No.16 
The defendant in the Ninth Circuit case petitioned for certiorari on September 4, 
2018.17 Instead of reviewing the case on the merits, the Supreme Court ruled on a 
procedural issue, thus vacating and remanding the case without addressing salary history 
and the school board’s affirmative defense.18 In 1992, the Supreme Court denied a 
petition for certiorari for another EPA case addressing whether the “factor other than sex” 
defense must be supported by a legitimate business reason.19 It continues to remain 
uncertain as to when the Court will decide to address the “factor other than sex” defense. 
This Ninth Circuit opinion adds a new perspective to an existing circuit split on 
whether prior salary can be considered a “factor other than sex ” in response to an EPA 
claim.20 The “factor other than sex” affirmative defense is one of four available to 
employers under the EPA framework. If the Supreme Court eventually addresses the use 
of salary history in EPA defenses, it should uphold the Ninth Circuit’s ruling that salary 
history is gendered and therefore cannot be used as an affirmative defense.  
A Supreme Court holding that salary history cannot be used as part of the “factor 
other than sex” affirmative defense to an EPA claim would be an important first step 
towards closing the gender pay gap. But the EPA can and should go further to protect 
plaintiffs. Moving forward, courts should treat an employer’s reliance on salary history as 
sufficient evidence of a gendered wage differential. Courts could do so under the model 
of reckless discrimination, a theory of liability that borrows principles from tort law. 
This Note will first address the history of pay equity in the United States. It will 
also address the current gender pay gap and efforts by states and local governments to 
address the use of salary history in new hire wage setting. Next, this Note will explore the 
current federal circuit split on the issue of salary history qualifying as a “factor other than 
sex” and explain why the Ninth Circuit’s refusal to recognize salary history as a “factor 
other than sex” is the correct interpretation of this fourth affirmative defense. Further, the 
Note will argue that reliance on salary history undermines the purpose of the EPA and 
therefore should not be used to establish an affirmative defense for employers. To the 
contrary, the Note will conclude, an employer’s reliance on an employee’s prior salary 
history constitutes reckless discrimination. 
I. BACKGROUND 
A. The Equal Pay Act and Pay Equity in the United States 
The need to prohibit gender-based wage discrimination arose after women entered 
the workplace to replace male employees who left to fight in the world wars.21 As of 
 
16 Rizo, 887 F.3d at 456.  
17 Petition for Writ of Certiorari, Yovino v. Rizo, 139 S. Ct. 706 (No. 18-272) (Aug. 30, 2018).  
18 Yovino v. Rizo, 139 S. Ct. 706, 710 (2019).  
19 Petition for Writ of Certiorari, Aldrich v. Randolph Cent. Sch. Dist., 963 F.2d 520 (2d Cir. 1992), cert. 
denied, 506 U.S. 965, 965 (1992).  
20 See infra Part III.  
21 Charlotte Alter, Here’s the History of the Battle for Equal Pay for American Women, TIME (Apr. 14, 
2015), https://time.com/3774661/equal-pay-history/.  
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1963, on average, women made 58.9 cents on every dollar a man made.22 However, 
somewhat ironically, advocacy supporting the EPA centered around a concern that men’s 
wages would decrease because businesses had the option of cheaper female labor.23 
Despite these wartime concerns, legislation addressing pay equality was not introduced 
until 1963,24 when Congress enacted the EPA to address the persistent pay disparity 
between men and women.25  
During Congress’s debate over the EPA, Democratic Senator Philip A. Hart, in 
support of pay equity, articulated the underlying values behind the EPA: 
Justice and fair play [sic] speak so eloquently [on] behalf of the equal pay 
for women bill that it seems unnecessary to belabor the point. We can only 
marvel that it has taken us so long to recognize the fact that equity and 
economic soundness support this legislation.26  
The mandate of the statute is simple: Employers cannot pay men and women 
differently for the same work.27 If employers are found liable under the EPA, they can 
assert one of four affirmative defenses: employers may argue that the wage disparity 
between male and female workers is justified if it was made pursuant to: “(i) a seniority 
system; (ii) a merit system; (iii) a system which measures earnings by quantity or quality 
of production; or (iv) a differential based on any other factor other than sex.”28 
Numerous legal scholars have criticized the “factor other than sex” defense as a 
broad loophole for businesses seeking to continue discriminatory practices or to benefit 
from the financial savings from the wage differential.29 As discussed in greater detail 
 
22 Katherine Gallagher Robbins & Abby Lane, The Wage Gap over Time, NAT’L WOMEN’S L. CTR. (May 3, 
2012), https://nwlc.org/blog/wage-gap-over-time/. The gap was even greater for women of color. For 
example, in 1967, Black women made only 43.2 cents for each dollar a white man earned. Id. 
23 Robbins, supra note 22; Alter, supra note 21. 
24 Alter, supra note 21.  
25 Robbins, supra note 22.  
26 109 CONG. REC. 8916 (1963) (statement of Sen. Hart). 
27 Equal Pay Act, 29 U.S.C. § 206(d)(1) (2016). The relevant portion of the text is as follows:  
No employer having employees subject to any provisions of this part shall discriminate, 
within any establishment in which such employees are employed, between employees on 
the basis of sex by paying wages to employees in such establishment at a rate less than 
the rate at which he pays wages to employees of the opposite sex in such establishment 
for equal work on jobs the performance of which requires equal skill, effort, and 
responsibility, and which are performed under similar working conditions, except where 
such payment is made pursuant to (i) a seniority system; (ii) a merit system; (iii) a system 
which measures earnings by quantity or quality of production; or (iv) a differential based 
on any other factor other than sex: Provided, That an employer who is paying a wage rate 
differential in violation of this subsection shall not, in order to comply with the 
provisions of this subsection, reduce the wage rate of any employee.  
28 Id.  
29 Carole Supowitz Katz, Wage Discrimination Claims: Employee’s Prior Salary Fails The ‘Factor Other 
Than Sex’ Test, 15 COLUM. HUM. RTS. L. REV. 207, 225–26 (1984). See, e.g., Peter Avery, The Diluted 
Equal Pay Act: How Was It Broken? How Can It Be Fixed?, 56 RUTGERS L. REV. 849, 863–71 (2004). See 
generally Jeanne M. Hamburg, When Prior Pay Isn’t Equal Pay: A Proposed Standard for the 
Identification of “Factors Other Than Sex” Under the Equal Pay Act, 89 COLUM. L. REV. 1085 (1989); 
Jeffrey K. Brown, Crossing the Line: The Second, Sixth, Ninth, and Eleventh Circuits’ Misapplication of 
the Equal Pay Act’s “Any Other Factor Other Than Sex” Defense, 13 HOFSTRA LAB. L.J. 181 (1995).  
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below, the federal circuits are split on how to address the “factor other than sex” 
defense.30 
Although the EPA has been in force for fifty-five years, the gender pay gap has not 
closed.31 Today, women make only 80.5 cents on every dollar earned by men in the 
United States.32 Certain states, localities, and territories of the United States have targeted 
salary history as a source of the perpetuation of the gender pay gap.33 The following 
subpart will discuss state and local legislation addressing salary history in wage-setting. 
B. State and Local Legislation Addressing Salary History 
As of 2019, twenty localities, sixteen states and Puerto Rico have passed legislation 
or executive orders prohibiting the use of salary history in wage setting practices.34 These 
laws vary in scope, both in terms of the types of employers covered and the restrictions 
that apply to those covered employers. 
Some states—such as California, Connecticut, Delaware, Hawaii, Massachusetts, 
Oregon, and Vermont and Puerto Rico—have passed laws that prohibit all employers, 
private and public, from seeking prior salary information.35 Two counties (Albany 
County, NY and Westchester County, NY) and two cities (New York City and San 
Francisco) passed similar ordinances.36 In states such as California, Hawaii, and Oregon, 
as well as at the local level in San Francisco and New York City, employers are barred 
from relying on an employee’s prior salary to determine what salary to offer, even if the 
employer discovers that information without solicitation.37 Additionally, employers in 
San Francisco are prohibited from disclosing prior salary even if such information is 
solicited by companies seeking to hire a former employee.38 In Massachusetts, employers 
 
30 See infra Part III.  
31 INSTITUTE FOR WOMEN’S POLICY RESEARCH, PAY EQUITY & DISCRIMINATION (2018), 
https://iwpr.org/issue/employment-education-economic-change/pay-equity-discrimination/. 
32 Id. The pay gap is even greater for women belonging to other protected classes. For example, Black 
women only earn 65 cents for every dollar a man makes. Id. Women with disabilities earn just over 52 
cents for every dollar a man without a disability makes. NATIONAL WOMEN’S RESOURCE LAW CENTER, 
THE WAGE GAP: THE WHO, HOW, WHY AND WHAT TO DO (2019), https://nwlc.org/resources/the-wage-
gap-the-who-how-why-and-what-to-do/.  
33 Salary History Bans: A Running List of States and Localities That Have Outlawed Pay History 
Questions, HUMAN RESOURCES DRIVE (Aug. 24, 2018), https://www.hrdive.com/news/salary-history-ban-
states-list/516662/ (last updated Dec. 6, 2019). 
34 Id.  
35 CAL. LAB. CODE § 432.3 (Deering 2019); CONN. GEN. STAT. § 18-8 (2019); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 19, § 
709B (2017); HAW. REV. STAT. § 378-2.4 (2019); MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 149, § 105A(b) (2018); OR. REV. 
STAT. § 652.220 (2017); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 21, § 495m (2017); P.R. LAWS ANN. (2017).  
36 S.F, CAL. POLICE & ADMINISTRATIVE CODES, No. 142-17 (2017); Committee on Civil Rights, 2017/067 
(2017), https://legistar.council.nyc.gov/LegislationDetail.aspx?ID=2813507&GUID=938399E5-6608-
42F5-9C83-9D2665D9496F&Options=&Search; Albany County, NY Local Law no. P for 2016; 
Westchester County, NY Resolution No. 28-2018 (2018).  
37 CAL. LAB. CODE § 432.3 (Deering 2019); HAW. REV. STAT. § 2351-1 (2018); OR. REV. STAT. § 652. 220 
(2017); S.F., CAL. POLICE & ADMINISTRATIVE CODES, No. 142-17 (2017); Committee on Civil Rights, 
2017/067 (2017), https://legistar.council.nyc.gov/LegislationDetail.aspx?ID=2813507&GUID=938399E5-
6608-42F5-9C83-9D2665D9496F&Options=&Search.  
38 CAL. LAB. CODE § 432.3; HAW. REV. STAT. § 2351-1 (2018); OR. REV. STAT. § 652.230 (2017); S.F., 
CAL., POLICE & ADMINISTRATIVE CODES, No. 142-17 (2017); Committee on Civil Rights, 2017/067 
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are not allowed to use salary history as a defense to a state claim of a gendered wage 
disparity, even if the candidate offered that information to the potential employer without 
solicitation.39 
Other states and localities have enacted legislation that only covers public 
employees. Five municipalities—Chicago, IL; Louisville Jefferson County, KY; New 
Orleans, LA; Kansas City, MO; and Pittsburgh, PA—forbid public employers from 
asking about salary history but have not extended that prohibition to the private sector.40 
In Pittsburgh, however, public employers may rely on prior salary to set present wages so 
long as the candidate offers the information unprompted.41 The New York State 
legislature has not yet passed a ban on inquiring about salary history.42 However, in 2017 
Governor Andrew Cuomo of New York State imposed restrictions on state agencies 
through an executive order.43 Similar executive orders have been imposed by Governor 
Tom Wolf of Pennsylvania and Governor Philip D. Murphy of New Jersey in 2018.44  
Although it was poised to be the first city to ban asking about salary history,45 
Philadelphia’s salary history ban46 on both public and private employers is currently 
being challenged in court.47 In April 2018, Judge Goldberg of the Eastern District of 
Pennsylvania granted a preliminary injunction against the ban on asking about salary 
history, holding that the ordinance violated the First Amendment.48 However, he did not 
grant an injunction against the prohibition against relying on prior salary to determine 
present wages.49 The city has not yet appealed this decision.50 
In contrast, some states have taken a pro-employer stance on the use of salary 
history. Michigan and Wisconsin both passed legislation prohibiting localities from 
instituting salary history bans.51 The language of the Wisconsin statute is illustrative of 
the mindset behind these prohibitions. The act sought to protect “the employer’s right to 




39 MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 149, § 105A(b) (2018). 
40 Chi., Ill., Exec. Order No. 2018-1 (2018); Louisville, Ky., Ordinance No. 066 (2018); New Orleans, La., 
Exec. Order MLJ 17-01 (2017); Kansas City, Mo., Resolution No. 180519 (2018); Pittsburgh, Pa., 
Ordinance No. 2017-1121 (2017).  
41 Pittsburgh, Pa., Ordinance No. 2017-1121 (2017).   
42 Chris Chrisbens, New York State’s Latest Push to Broaden Salary History Ban, PAY EQUITY ADVISOR 
BLOG (Apr. 19, 2018), https://www.payequityadvisor.com/2018/04/new-york-states-latest-push-to-broaden-
salary-history-ban/.  
43 Governor of the State of New York, Exec. Order No. 161 (2017). 
44 Governor of the State of Pennsylvania, Exec. Order No. 2018-18-03 (2018); Governor of the State of 
New Jersey, Exec. Order No. 1 (2018). 
45 Valerie Bolden-Barrett, Philadelphia Becomes First US City to Ban Pay History Questions, HUMAN 
RESOURCES DRIVE (Feb. 10, 2017), https://www.hrdive.com/news/philadelphia-becomes-first-us-city-to-
ban-pay-history-questions/435894/.  
46 Philadelphia, Pa., Wage Equity Ordinance No. 7.4 (2017).  
47 Kathryn Moody, Philadelphia’s Salary History Ban Violates First Amendment, Judge Says, HUMAN 
RESOURCES DRIVE (May 2, 2018), https://www.hrdive.com/news/philadelphias-salary-history-ban-violates-
first-amendment-judge-says/522569/.  
48 Chamber of Commerce for Greater Phila. v. City of Phila., 319 F. Supp. 3d 773, 812 (E.D. Pa. 2018).  
49 Id. 
50 Moody, supra note 47. 
51 MICH. COMP. LAWS SERV. § 123.1384 (Lexis 2018); WIS. STAT. ANN. § 103.36 (West 2018).  
52 Id. at § 103.36 (2018).  
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question of reliance on salary history. These statutes suggest that the Michigan and 
Wisconsin state legislatures worry that localities will unnecessarily interfere with the 
business in their state.53 
While certain states, territories, and localities have made steps towards prohibiting 
the use of and reliance on salary history in new hire wage determinations, actions in 
states such as Michigan and Wisconsin, as well as Philadelphia’s salary history ban, show 
that it is necessary to abolish the use of salary history by closing loopholes in federal 
legislation. As discussed later in this Note, the EPA already prohibits the use of salary 
history to justify a wage differential.54 The problem lies not with the EPA, but rather with 
many circuits’ interpretations that allow salary history to constitute the fourth affirmative 
defense.  
II. SALARY HISTORY – AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSE OR GENDERED? 
The circuit courts take varying approaches to the salary history affirmative defense. 
Some circuits allow salary history to be the sole “factor other than sex,” while other 
circuits allow the use of salary history as a justification so long as it is paired with other 
considerations.55 The Ninth Circuit’s holding in Rizzo v. Yovino makes that Circuit the 
outlier, as it is the only Circuit that outright prohibits the use of salary history as the 
fourth affirmative defense.56 
A. The Seventh and Eighth Circuits: Employers Can Defend with Salary 
History Alone 
The decisions of the Seventh and Eighth Circuits view the “factor other than sex” 
defense the most broadly, and therefore the most employer-friendly. Both Circuits allow 
a defendant’s reliance on prior salary, without more, to qualify as the fourth affirmative 
defense.57 
In Wernsing v. Department of Human Services, the Seventh Circuit held that prior 
salary is a legitimate “factor other than sex” that may stand on its own without requiring 
additional justification for the wage differential.58 The plaintiff, Wernsing, was hired in 
the Office of the Inspector General in the Department of Human Services in Illinois 
(Department) as an internal security investigator.59 Wernsing entered the Department 
from the private sector, where her total salary was significantly less than the lowest salary 
offered in the Department.60 Upon her hiring, the Department started her at a monthly pay 
 
53 WIS. STAT. ANN. § 103.36 (West 2018); MICH. COMP. LAWS SERV. § 123.1384. “A local governmental 
body shall not adopt, enforce, or administer an ordinance, local policy, or local resolution regulating 
information an employer or potential employer must … exclude on an application.” Id.  
54 See infra Part IV. 
55 See infra Part III, subparts i-iii. 
56 See infra Part II.   
57 Taylor v. White, 321 F.3d 710, 715 (8th Cir. 2003); Wernsing v. Dep’t of Human Servs., 427 F. 3d 466, 
468 (7th Cir. 2005). 
58 Wernsing, 427 F.3d at 468.  
59 Id. at 467.  
60 Id. 
Vol. 15:2]    Kate Vandenberg 
 253 
rate of $2,478. This figure represented an almost 30% pay increase from what she was 
making in the private sector.61 
If the facts ended there, Wernsing would seem to have been treated very well at the 
Department. However, male employees in substantially similar roles to her earned 
significantly more than Wernsing.62 For example, one male employee in a similar role 
commenced his employment with the Department at a monthly salary of $3,739.63 Based 
on these facts, Wernsing had a prima facie case for wage discrimination, but the 
Department escaped liability by raising the “factor other than sex” affirmative defense.64 
Wernsing argued that “because women earn less than men from private 
employment, all market wages must be discriminatory and therefore must be ignored 
when setting salaries.”65 The Seventh Circuit accepted her argument empirically but 
attributed the statistics to a difference in experience, which the court held was not an 
inherently discriminatory motive to pay the individuals differently.66 It argued that 
because women take time out of the workplace to rear children, they have less 
employment experience than men, which justified the compensation differential.67 The 
court reasoned that “[w]ages rise with experience as well as with other aspects of human 
capital.”68 
The Seventh Circuit’s reasoning ultimately undermines its holding. Even if we 
concede that the gender pay gap is caused exclusively by maternity leave, the resulting 
pay differential is inherently gendered by the fact that only women get pregnant. As such, 
the Seventh Circuit erred in allowing salary history to be used as a “factor other than 
sex.”69 Alternatively, if the Seventh Circuit is implying that an experience differential 
results in a pay differential, then the court could have (and should have) required the 
Department to show a difference in the level of experience that Wernsing held compared 
with her male counterparts. A gap in experience would have been a legitimate, 
ungendered justification for the wage differential.   
Similarly, the Eighth Circuit has treated the fourth affirmative defense as a “catch-
all” for any excuse an employer could create to explain a wage gap between men and 
women.70 In Taylor v. White, the Eighth Circuit dismissed the plaintiff’s argument that a 
reliance on prior salary perpetuates the gender pay gap because she failed to show that 
the reliance was gendered.71 The plaintiff, Taylor, worked as a civilian employee at the 
Army’s Arkansas Arsenal (the Arsenal).72 She and three other employees, one female and 
two males, transferred to a different program where all of the individuals “shared a lack 
 
61 Id. Both the plaintiff and her male counterparts held the title “Internal Security Investigator II.” Brief for 
Appellant-Petitioner at *9, Wernsing v. Dep’t of Human Servs., 427 F. 3d 466 (7th Cir. 2005) (No. 04-
2225), 2005 U.S. 7th Cir. Briefs LEXIS 160.  
62 Wernsing, 427 F. 3d at 467. 
63 Id. 
64 Id. at 471. 
65 Id. at 470.  
66 Id. 
67 Id. “That many women spend more years in child-rearing than do men thus implies that women’s market 
wages will be lower on average.” Id. 
68 Id.  
69 See id. at 468–70. 
70 Taylor, 321 F.3d at 715. 
71 Id. at 720–21. 
72 Id. at 712.  
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of relevant experience and training” when they first began the program.73 Despite this, 
Taylor and the other female employee began the program at a lower salary than their 
male counterpart.74  
In its opinion, the Eighth Circuit cautioned that an employer should not justify 
paying women less simply because the market does so.75 It was also wary about the 
plaintiff’s prior salary being used to perpetuate lower wages because that would risk 
perpetuating the gender pay gap.76 Nevertheless, the court still upheld the use of salary 
history as a “factor other than sex” because, while the wage differential was suspect, the 
Eighth Circuit did not find that the employer’s actions rose “above the level of merely 
suspicious.”77 Just like the Seventh Circuit, the Eighth Circuit conceded that reliance on 
prior salary runs a risk of perpetuating the gender pay gap.78 However, both Circuits have 
allowed salary history to be interpreted as  a gender-neutral affirmative defense in 
subsequent cases.79 These Circuits have failed to uphold the purpose of the EPA by 
allowing a gendered practice to set new hire wages. 
B. The Tenth and Eleventh Circuits: Salary History as One Element of the 
Affirmative Defense 
The Tenth and Eleventh Circuits have taken a relatively more employee-friendly 
approach, allowing consideration of salary history only when it is not the sole 
justification for a wage disparity.80 However, these Circuits’ reasoning still demonstrates 
an unsatisfactory approach to the fourth affirmative defense. 
In Irby v. Bittick, the plaintiff began working as an undercover agent for the county 
sheriff before moving to other divisions within the police force.81 Eventually, she was the 
only female investigator in the criminal investigations division.82 Irby later discovered 
that the division paid her less than her male colleagues, despite doing substantially the 
same work.83 
The Eleventh Circuit accepted the defendant’s affirmative “factor other than sex” 
defense because the employer set the male employees’ salaries higher after considering 
both salary history and experience.84 To the court, the combination of factors justified the 
wage disparity between men and women.85  
However, in its reasoning, the Eleventh Circuit laid out the standard that 
“defendants must how that the factor of sex provided no basis for the wage 
 
73 Id. at 713.  
74 Id. 
75 Id. at 718. 
76 Id. at 718–19.  
77 Id. at 722. The court held that “no reasonable finder of fact could reject the undisputed evidence 
concerning the actual employees in this case and the benefits received by those employees.” Id. at 723. 
78 Id. 
79 Lauderdale v. Ill. Dep’t of Human Servs., 876 F.3d 904, 908 (7th Cir. 2017); Drum v. Leeson Elec. 
Corp., 565 F.3d 1071, 1072-73 (8th Cir. 2009). 
80 Riser v. QEP Energy, 776 F.3d 1191, 1199 (10th Cir. 2015); Glenn v. General Motors Corp., 841 F.2d 
1567, 1571 (11th Cir. 1988). 
81 Irby v. Bittick, 44 F.3d 949, 952 (11th Cir. 1995). 
82 Id. 
83 Id. 
84 Id. at 955.  
85 Id. at 959. 
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differential.”86 Additionally, the Eleventh Circuit previously held that prior salary alone 
cannot qualify as a factor other than sex.87 If salary history does not qualify as a “factor 
other than sex,” then it is illogical to allow defendant employers to use salary history at 
all, even with other rationales, when raising the fourth affirmative defense.  
Similarly, employers in the Tenth Circuit are required to bundle prior salary 
information with other factors to satisfy the “factor other than sex” affirmative defense in 
a wage disparity case.88 In Mickelson v. New York Life Insurance Company, the plaintiff 
was hired at an insurance company but earned a significantly lower starting salary than 
her male colleagues, despite her professional experience and a law degree.89 When she 
inquired about this wage disparity, she was told that the company sets salaries by 
weighing experience, qualifications, market factors, and salary history.90 However, the 
plaintiff did not find these rationales believable, as she had more experience than her 
male colleague who made a higher salary.91 Unsatisfied with her employer’s explanation, 
she continued to complain to individuals higher up on the supervisory chain, which 
eventually led to alleged retaliatory adverse employment actions.92  
For context, the Tenth Circuit agreed with the premise that while prior salary alone 
cannot justify a wage disparity between the sexes, it can be used in conjunction with 
other rationales to function as an affirmative defense under the EPA.93 However, the 
court failed to rationalize why salary history information alone would not justify a pay 
differential, inferring that without more, the employer may be found to have 
discriminated against the employee.94 As with the flawed reasoning of the Eleventh 
Circuit, it is not logical to prohibit a practice in isolation because it is discriminatory 
against one gender, but then conversely hold that the same practice is not discriminatory 
on the basis of gender when it is paired with other factors. A gendered rationale is 
illegitimate regardless if it is paired with another factor or justified by a legitimate 
business rationale.95  
C. The Second and Sixth Circuits: Salary History as a Legitimate Business Purpose 
The Second and Sixth Circuits take a more moderate approach than the Seventh 
and Eighth Circuits by requiring the “factor other than sex” defense to be supported by a 
legitimate business purpose,96 similar to the Ninth Circuit’s abandoned reasoning in 
Kouba v. Allstate Insurance Co.97 While the issue of salary history and the fourth 
affirmative defense has not been explicitly addressed by these Circuits, their rationales 
behind similar applications of the defense can be used to anticipate how they might 
 
86 Id. at 954 (citing Mulhall v. Advance Sec., Inc., 19 F.3d 586, 589-90 (11th Cir. 1994)). 
87 Glenn v. General Motors Corp., 841 F.2d 1567, 1571 (11th Cir. 1988).  
88 Mickelson v. New York Life Ins. Co., 460 F.3d 1304, 1307-11 (10th Cir. 2006). 
89 Id. at 1308.  
90 Id. at 1309. 
91 Id. at 1313. 
92 Id. at 1309–10. For example, Ms. Mickelson alleges that she was denied leave and a promotion. The 
court found the claims of retaliation unfounded. 
93 Id. at 1314 (“To be sure, [other reasons for the wage differential] could explain the disparity. . .”).  
94 Id. at 1312–14.  
95 See supra Part II, subpart iii.  
96 Aldrich v. Randolph Cent. School Dist., 963 F.2d 520, 526 (2d Cir. 1992). 
97 Kouba, 691 F.2d at 878. 
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approach salary history in future cases, assuming the Supreme Court does not rule on this 
issue. 
In Aldrich v. Randolph Cent. School Dist., the plaintiff worked for a school district 
under the title of “cleaner,” and earned less than her coworkers who were classified as 
“custodians.”98 All of the cleaners for the school district were women, and all of the 
custodians were men.99 The school district argued that the pay differential was not 
because of the different genders of the two jobs, but was caused instead by the 
classification system applied to the two roles.100 However, the Second Circuit held that 
“an employer bears the burden of proving that a bona fide business-related reason exists 
for using the gender-neutral factor . . . in order to establish the factor-other-than-sex 
defense.”101 Because the school district could not provide a legitimate reason for the 
classification system, the court did not allow it to be used as a “factor other than sex” 
defense.102 However, this suggests that the Second Circuit would be willing to allow 
policies that overtly implicate gender, as the classification in Aldrich did, so long as those 
policies have an underlying business rationale, although this has not yet been definitively 
applied. 
The Sixth Circuit similarly limits the fourth affirmative defense, holding that the 
“‘factor other than sex’ defense does not include literally any other factor, but a factor 
that, at a minimum, was adopted for a legitimate business reason.”103 For example, in a 
suit arguing a violation of the EPA, the plaintiff in Beck-Wilson v. Principi established a 
question of fact for the jury when she demonstrated that her that her job as nurse 
practitioner, which was predominantly occupied by female employees, could be viewed 
as substantially similar to the role of physician assistant, a job predominantly filled by 
male employees.104 On appeal, the Sixth Circuit remanded the claim, reasoning that a 
reasonable factfinder could have found the employer’s rationale for different pay scales 
for the two positions to be illegitimate, or, in other words, a pretext for discrimination.105 
The court therefore held that summary judgment for the employer was in error, and the 
case was remanded.106 However, the Sixth Circuit was not inherently hostile towards the 
use of different pay scales; it simply required that the employer produce a legitimate 
business justification for its practice.107 
In light of these decisions, it is likely that both the Second and Sixth Circuits would 
welcome the presentation of prior salary history information as a basis to support the 
fourth affirmative defense so long as employers have a legitimate business reason for 
relying on prior salary information. However, as discussed later in this Note,108 
businesses have ample resources for determining a new hire’s wage, which do not rely on 
a potentially discriminatory metric. Therefore, reliance on prior salary cannot be a 
 
98 Aldrich, 963 F.2d at 522. 
99 Id.  
100 Id. at 524.  
101 Id. at 526. 
102 Id. 
103 EEOC v. J.C. Penney Co., 843 F.2d 249, 253 (6th Cir. 1988). 
104 441 F.3d 353, 356 (6th Cir. 2006).  
105 Id. at 363. 
106 Id. at 369. 
107 Id. at 368-69.  
108 See infra Part IV.  
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legitimate business practice, as there are alternatives that do not carry the risk of liability 
under the EPA.109  
In County of Washington v. Gunther, the Supreme Court held that the application of 
the EPA is confined to “the act of wage differentials attributable to sex 
discrimination,”110 allowing employers to defend against a claim with a bona fide use of 
the “factor other than sex” defense. In the following part, this Note will show why the 
reliance on salary history to determine present wages is not a bona fide “factor other than 
sex” and will argue that the Ninth Circuit’s opinion in Rizo v. Yovino111 is thus consistent 
with Supreme Court precedent.  
III. RECKLESSNESS IN EMPLOYMENT 
Professor Stephanie Bornstein articulated a model of “reckless discrimination” 
under Title VII, whereby an employer’s reckless disregard for biased employment 
practices can establish a Title VII discrimination claim.112 Title VII bans discrimination 
based on protected classes, including race and gender.113 Under Bornstein’s model, 
plaintiffs would be allowed to bring a claim for an employer’s reckless disregard for 
biased employment practices under Title VII.114 Based on the circuits’ inconsistent 
holdings on the use of salary history as a factor other than sex, this author proposes that a 
model of recklessness in employment law should be applied to the EPA to cover 
employers who continue to use salary history to determine new hire salaries.  
A. Bornstein and Title VII 
In her 2017 article titled Reckless Discrimination, Bornstein was the first to 
articulate a model of reckless discrimination that applied to Title VII claims.115 Bornstein 
argued that the modeling of discrimination law after tort law is appropriate given recent 
Supreme Court decisions.116 Specifically, the Roberts Court decided three cases between 
2009 and 2013 that applied tort concepts, particularly causation and proximate cause, to 
discrimination cases.117 In one case, Justice Scalia, writing for the majority, directly 
acknowledged the incorporation of “the traditional tort-law concept of proximate cause” 
into the opinion.118 
Some scholars have expressed concern about the “tortification” of discrimination 
law, fearing that but-for causation and proximate cause are high bars for a plaintiff to 
 
109 See infra Part IV(b).  
110 Washington v. Gunther, 452 U.S 161, 170 (1981). 
111 Rizo, 887 F.3d at 453. 
112 Stephanie Bornstein, Reckless Discrimination, CAL. L. REV. 1055, 1059 (2017). 
113 42 U.S.C. § 2000(e)-2.  
114 Bornstein, supra note 112, at 1059.  
115 Id. at 1055. 
116 Id. at 1088. 
117 Id. (citing Gross v. FBL Fin. Servs., Inc., 557 U.S. 167, 173-80 (2009); Univ. of Tex. Sw. Med. Ctr. V. 
Nassar, 133 S. Ct. 2517, 2525 (2013); Staub v. Proctor Hospital, 562 U.S. 411 (2011)). While the Roberts 
Court has not explicitly called for the “tortifying” of employment discrimination, it has applied tort 
concepts to these three employment discrimination cases.  
118 Staub, 562 U.S. at 420.  
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meet in discrimination cases.119 These scholars argue that discrimination law requires 
only that a plaintiff’s protected class be a motivating factor in the adverse action, a lower 
bar than what tort law requires.120  
However, recent Supreme Court precedent applies tort concepts to discrimination 
claims, and moving forward, plaintiffs will need to meet the standards laid out by the 
Court, even if the bar was raised by the application of tort concepts.121 For example, in 
Staub v. Proctor Hospital, the Court adopted the tort law concept of proximate cause, 
holding that the plaintiff’s protected class need only be a motivating factor in the 
employer’s discriminatory employment action.122 In University of Texas Southwest 
Medical Center v. Nassar, the Court went so far as to describe the “but for” causation 
standard used in that case as “textbook tort law” that was the “background against which 
Congress legislated in enacting Title VII.”123 Bornstein’s application of tort law concepts 
to discrimination law thus extends the Roberts Court’s understanding of Title VII. 
Under Bornstein’s model of reckless discrimination, plaintiffs must show two 
elements of recklessness in their employer’s practices to establish a Title VII claim. First, 
plaintiffs must show that the employer knew or should have known of the risk of 
perpetuating discrimination by using the specific  employment practice at issue.124 
Second, the plaintiff needs to show that the employer’s burden to reduce the risk of the 
employment practice perpetuating discrimination was slight, demonstrating the 
employer’s “indifference to the risk.”125 These elements are modeled after the 
Restatement (Third) of Torts.126 
Bornstein applies this framework to workplace policies and practices, particularly 
those dealing with hiring and promotion, to provide employees with a new cause of 
action under Title VII.127 Under the model, a Title VII plaintiff would point to social 
science data that demonstrate the extent to which stereotypes and biases infiltrate the 
workforce and affect employment decision-making.128 Additionally, a plaintiff would 
also need to point to the prevalence of implicit bias in “mainstream lexicon” as providing 
the employer with adequate notice.129 For example, an employee who seeks to show that 
he was passed on for a promotion could point to studies that show that men of color are 
less likely to be promoted than white men; he would then have to show that this is a 
 
119 Martha Chamallas & Sandra F. Sperino, Torts and Civil Rights Law: Migration and Conflict: 
Symposium Introduction, 75 OHIO ST. L.J. 1021, 1021–22 (2014); Sandra F. Sperino, The Tort Label, 66 
FLA. L. REV. 1051, 1074–75 (2014). 
120 Charles A. Sullivan, Tortifying Employment Discrimination, 92 B.U. L. Rev. 1431, 1451-53 (2012). 
121 Bornstein, supra note 112, at 1088.  
122 562 U.S. at 413-15.  
123 133 S. Ct. at 2524-25.  
124 Bornstein, supra note 112, at 1106. 
125 Id. (quoting Restatement (Third) of Torts § 2). 
126 RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS § 2. 
 A person acts recklessly in engaging in conduct if: 
(a) The person knows of the risk of harm created by the conduct or knows facts that 
make the risk obvious to another in the person’s situation, and 
(b) The precaution that would eliminate or reduce the risk involves burdens that are 
so slight relative to the magnitude of the risk as to render the person’s failure to 
adopt the precaution a demonstration of the person’s indifference to the risk. Id.  
127 Bornstein, supra note 112, at 1093.  
128 Id. at 1094. 
129 Id. at 1095. 
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problem that is often covered in implicit bias trainings and other human resource 
department materials. These developments fulfill the first element of reckless 
discrimination, as this would show that the employer knows or should know that biases 
and stereotypes may result in discrimination against protected groups.130  
Second, the plaintiff would need to show that other employers within the plaintiff’s 
industry have voluntarily and successfully taken steps to reduce bias in their 
workforce.131 For example, many employers have diversified their recruitment processes, 
created diversity initiatives, established protocols and policies to reduce harassment, and 
monitored the effects their practices have on the diversity of their workforce.132  
Technology has also created the ability for employers to conduct blind screenings 
of applicants.133 This prevents implicit biases of the hiring committee to unfairly 
disadvantage certain candidates. Not only are these best practices only minimally 
burdensome, but they have been shown to be ultimately profitable for employers by 
establishing a reputation of progressive anti-discrimination policies.134 A failure to 
engage in these best practices allows for the inference that the employer is indifferent to 
the risk that its practices are discriminatory. By satisfying these two elements, the 
plaintiff would adequately state a claim for reckless discrimination under Title VII. 
B. Applicability to the Equal Pay Act 
Given the recent developments in the Roberts Court, it is “doctrinally incoherent 
for the Court to fail to extend tort concepts to Title VII.”135 Similarly, it would be 
incoherent to fail to extend the concept of recklessness to the EPA, especially given the 
fact that many courts treat the EPA and Title VII interchangeably in discrimination 
jurisprudence.136   
If adopted, the reckless discrimination model could correct the circuit split on 
whether prior pay history qualifies as a “factor other than sex.” Not only would the model 
of reckless discrimination undermine an employer’s affirmative defense, but it would 
function as proof of liability for a discriminatory wage differential under the EPA. For 
example, after an EPA plaintiff establishes that there is a pay differential along gender 
lines, the defendant employer may raise the “factor other than sex” defense by arguing 
that it relied on the plaintiff’s prior salary to set her new salary.137 The plaintiff could 
then attempt to undermine that affirmative defense through the model of reckless 
discrimination, as described below. Not only would this model show that reliance on 
prior salary is not a “factor other than sex,” but it would lend weight to the plaintiff’s 
claim that the pay differential she suffered was, in fact, “on the basis of sex.”138 
 
130 Id. at 1094–96. 
131 Id. at 1096–99.  
132 Id. at 1097–98.  
133 Id. at 1100. 
134 Id. at 1102.  
135 Id. at 1104. 
136 See generally Peter Avery, The Diluted Equal Pay Act: How Was It Broke? How Can It Be Fixed?, 56 
RUTGERS L. REV. 849 (2004). “[C]ourts often mangle the analysis when they are confronted with Equal 
Pay Act and Title VII claims side-by-side. . . Judges cannot be expected to be experts in employment law.” 
Id. at 863.  
137 See, e.g., Riser, 776 F.3d at 1193.  
138 29 U.S.C. § 206(d)(1). 
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In order to use the reckless discrimination model to show that the use of salary 
history is a gendered employment practice, not a “factor other than sex,” the plaintiff 
would first need to show that the employer knew or should have known that using salary 
history carries the risk of perpetuating discrimination.139 First and foremost, the gender 
pay gap is well-documented.140 Not only do human resource departments have access to a 
vast amount of research on the pay gap, but the gender pay gap is also well-publicized 
through Equal Pay Day (as well as other Pay Days for intersectional identities)141 and the 
passage of state and local regulations banning employers from asking about prior 
salary.142 Furthermore, organizations like the Society for Human Resource Management 
encourage their members to forgo reliance on salary history in favor of setting present 
salary based on other factors such as market data and objective qualifications.143 Given 
the prevalence of this information in both the human resource space and in the news more 
broadly, it is reasonable to expect employers to know that relying on salary history to 
determine present wages carries the risk of perpetuating discrimination. Employers would 
be unable to rebut the presumption by claiming that they did not have actual or 
constructive knowledge of these best practices, given the wide coverage of these best 
practices. 
In defense, employers may argue that the issue of adequate notice is foreclosed by 
the current precedent in the circuit courts.144 However, this proposed framework allows 
for evolving standards in human resources and shifts in social science to bolster the 
plaintiff’s claims in light of negative precedent. Recklessness in employment practices 
looked different when the Ninth Circuit decided Kouba v. Allstate Insurance Co. in 
1982.145 In the thirty-six years since that case, employers (and courts) have learned a 
great deal more about implicit bias, diversity in the workplace, and the gender pay gap, as 
evidenced by the Ninth Circuit’s holding in Rizo.146 While this Note discusses 
recklessness in wage-setting generally, the court should engage in a fact-intensive 
inquiry; therefore, what an employer should have known in 1982 will look different than 
what an employer should have known today. Thus, existing circuit court precedent does 
not undermine the notice requirement.  
 
139 RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS § 2 (AM. LAW INST. 2005); Bornstein, Reckless Discrimination, supra 
note 112, at 1095. 
140 Mary Cornish, Closing the Global Gender Pay Gap: Securing Justice for Women’s Work, 28 COMP. 
LAB. L. & POL’Y J. 219 (2007); Alexandra N. Phillips, Promulgating Parity: An Argument for A States-
Based Approach to Valuing Women’s Work And Ensuring Pay Equity In The United States, 92 TUL. L. 
REV. 719 (2018). See generally Stephanie Bornstein, Equal Work, 77 MD. L. REV. 581 (2018). 
141 See P.R. Lockhart, Tuesday is Black Woman’s Pay Day. Here’s What You Should Know About the Gap., 
VOX ONLINE (Aug. 7, 2018), https://www.vox.com/identities/2018/8/7/17657416/black-womens-equal-
pay-day-gender-racial-pay-gap; see, e.g., Lilly Ledbetter, Lilly Ledbetter: My #MeToo Moment, N.Y. 
TIMES (Apr. 9, 2018), https://www.nytimes.com/2018/04/09/opinion/lilly-ledbetter-metoo-equal-pay.html; 
Shelley Zalis, What You Need to Know About Latina Equal Pay Day,” FORBES ONLINE (Nov. 1, 2018), 
https://www.forbes.com/sites/shelleyzalis/2018/11/01/what-you-need-to-know-about-latina-equal-pay-
day/#45303d98b732.  
142 See supra Part II(b)(ii).  
143 Susan Milligan, Salary History Could Reshape Pay Negotiations, SOC’Y FOR HUM. RESOURCE MGMT. 
(Feb. 16, 2018), https://www.shrm.org/hr-today/news/hr-magazine/0318/pages/salary-history-bans-could-
reshape-pay-negotiations.aspx.  
144 See supra Part III.  
145 Kouba, 691 F.2d at 878. 
146 Rizo, 887 F.3d at 456. 
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The second element of reckless discrimination requires an evaluation of the burden 
on employers to avoid the risk of discrimination.147 State and local laws that prohibit 
employers from inquiring about prior salary imply that there are other ways that public 
and private employers alike can determine a new hire’s salary.148 Additionally, human 
resource departments and organizations have long used other methods to establish a 
starting salary,149 including: evaluating the new hire’s qualifications and experiences 
against current employees; conducting market research that considers comparable 
positions beyond job title; updating salary schedules regularly; and considering the 
requirements of a position holistically, as opposed to relying solely on the job title.150  
The ability to avoid the risk by using other wage-setting practices may depend on 
the employer’s industry or the size of the company, and this second element requires a 
fact-intensive inquiry. However, given the multitude of alternatives available to 
employers and human resource departments to avoid the risk of perpetuating wage 
discrimination, it is likely that the failure to avoid using prior salary to set present wages 
would constitute an “indifference to the risk” of perpetuating pay discrimination.151  
If the Supreme Court eventually addresses the fourth affirmative defense as used in 
Rizo, it should categorize salary history as inherently gendered. Thus, rather than 
functioning as an affirmative defense, proof of an employer’s reliance on prior salary 
would instead prove employer liability under the EPA.  
C. Counterarguments 
Proponents for the use of prior salary information to determine new hire wages may 
argue that the EPA does not require employers to completely close the gender pay gap.152 
However, the EPA does forbid employers from engaging in practices that amount to pay 
discrimination, even if employers are not tasked with eliminating all societal 
contributions to the gender pay gap. Employers are responsible for their policies and 
practices. The reckless discrimination framework holds employers accountable for 
adopting and maintaining policies that may perpetuate pay discrimination. This 
framework does not impose additional responsibilities on businesses to fix society at 
large; it does, however, require employers to clean up their own shops by ending the 
recklessly discriminatory practice of relying on salary history.  
Furthermore, a Amici Curiae Brief by the Center for Workplace Compliance and 
National Federation of Independent Business Small Business Legal Center prepared for 
the Rizo petition for writ of certiorari argues that the gender wage gap cannot be pinned 
 
147 RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS § 2 (2005).  
148 Martha T. Moore, These States Are Banning Questions About Salary History to Close The Pay Gap, 
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152 Brief for the Center for Workplace Compliance and National Federation of Independent Business Small 
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on any one cause; it argues that blaming the gap on salary history alone is unfounded and 
unnecessary.153 The brief points to a 2009 study that identified a number of factors, such 
as women having to pause their careers when they become pregnant and different choices 
in occupation along gender lines, that could also explain the persistence of the gender pay 
gap.154 This Note makes no assertions about the cause of the gender pay gap, only that 
employers run the risk of perpetuating that gap by relying on salary history. Thus, factors 
other than salary history can and should be used to set wages.   
Relying on salary history does not allow employers to make an assessment of an 
applicant’s potential contribution to the company. It merely uses a metric established by a 
previous employer to set an employee’s salary despite both the risk of perpetuating the 
gender pay gap and the availability of other tools to set wages. As an alternative, 
employers can use an employee’s amount and quality of professional experience and 
level of education to determine wages. Reliance on salary history carries a risk of 
perpetuating a discriminatory wage differential, and employers should be liable if they do 
not use best practices in their industry to determine a new hire’s salary.   
Other scholars worry that forbidding employers from relying on salary history may 
actually exacerbate the gender pay gap.155 They fear that without salary history 
information, employers will instead rely on a practice called “statistical discrimination,” 
an economic term for reliance on group averages in place of individualized 
information.156 These scholars argue that in the absence of individualized information, 
employers will make assumptions about a woman’s prior salary based on women’s 
salaries in the aggregate, which would exacerbate the gender pay gap.157 This argument 
conveniently ignores the fact that the EPA still holds employers liable for wage 
differentials—even when they do not use salary history as an affirmative defense. If an 
employer relies on statistical discrimination, rather than an employee’s prior salary, to 
pay female employees less than male employees, the employer’s actions are nevertheless 
prohibited by the EPA because these statistics are gendered on their face.  
Alternatively, other scholars fear that the void of salary histories may leave women 
to negotiate their salaries, which may disproportionately harm women.158 Studies show 
that women tend to undervalue their economic worth to a company, a phenomenon called 
entitlement theory, which leads to women negotiating for lower salaries, as well as 
employers offering female candidates weaker compensation packages.159 Some scholars 
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go so far as to advocate for the practice of negotiating salaries as failing to satisfy the as a 
“factor other than sex” affirmative defense as well.160  
As discussed above,161 employers have ample information that is independent from 
prior salary information or from direct negotiation tactics that can be used to determine 
present wages. However, it is important to note that the model of reckless discrimination 
as applied to salary history does not seek to end all wage discrimination and close the 
gender pay gap completely; that is a monumental task that will require a number of 
private, local, state, and federal initiatives. This Note merely proposes to close one 
loophole that has allowed employers to perpetuate discrimination without liability and 
does not aim to tackle the problem of salary negotiations, although it is possible that the 
reckless discrimination framework could be applied to other employment practices. 
Finally, opponents to this framework may argue that the issue of reliance on salary 
history should be resolved by Congress through the Paycheck Fairness Act (PFA) instead 
of by the courts through the EPA.162 The PFA is a proposed bill that aims to address 
shortcomings of the EPA and the Lilly Ledbetter Fair Pay Act.163 A cornerstone of this 
bill is a provision that would explicitly narrow the “factor other than sex” affirmative 
defense.164 In theory, the PFA seems like a sufficient remedy. However, it has failed to 
pass time and time again,165 in no small part because many members of Congress worry 
about limiting business discretion in employment practices.166 It could be argued that 
Congress has also failed to narrow the scope of the “factor other than sex” defense; 
however, Congressional action is unnecessary because social science research and 
improvements in human resources departments’ best practices and policies already 
narrow the scope of the affirmative defense. 
While the PFA may be the future solution to many loopholes in pay equity 
legislation, the EPA as currently written provides the necessary language for closing the 
prior salary loophole found in the fourth affirmative defense. The EPA mandates that 
“[n]o employer . . . shall discriminate . . . between employees on the basis of sex.”167 
Research demonstrates the gendered nature of salary history, and that improved 
understanding should be used to reexamine interpretations of the EPA as written. 
Furthermore, this is not a case of either/or, but rather an opportunity to get relief for 
plaintiffs harmed by reliance on salary history using existing law while Congress works 
towards larger systemic changes to close the gender pay gap.   
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The Ninth Circuit correctly overturned its earlier line of cases that allowed salary 
history to qualify as a “factor other than sex” in the fourth affirmative defense to an EPA 
claim.168 As the Circuit explained, salary history is inherently gendered, and its use as an 
affirmative defense undermines the goals of the EPA.169  
The Ninth Circuit’s reasoning adds to the growing understanding that reliance on 
salary history perpetuates the gender pay gap. As evidenced by the actions taken by ten 
states, nine local governments, and Puerto Rico to eliminate the reliance on prior history 
to set new wages, many have accepted the premise that forbidding employers from 
inquiring about prior salary can help close the gender pay gap. To that end, plaintiffs 
should be able to co-opt this former affirmative defense and hold employers liable for 
reckless discrimination. The framework for reckless discrimination does not rely on 
outdated precedent, but instead looks to social science to address a persistent problem in 
employment. Just as the Ninth Circuit and a number of state and local governments have 
reconsidered their approach to salary history, plaintiffs should rethink how they frame 
their wage differential claims under the Equal Pay Act.     
If the Supreme Court has the opportunity to address the fourth affirmative defense 
in an Equal Pay Act claim, the Court should view the reliance on salary history as a 
gendered practice which does not qualify as a “factor other than sex” under the EPA. In 
future cases, plaintiffs should argue that an employer’s reliance on prior salary is proof of 
liability for a wage differential under the model of reckless discrimination. Closing the 
“factor other than sex” loophole in the EPA is one necessary step, albeit small, towards 
closing the gender pay gap.  
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169 Id.  
